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Abstract 
This paper examines the efficiency of 116 banks for 9 new EU members in Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries over the period 2004-2015. We employ the Weight 
Assurance Region (WAR) and we treat deposits as an intermediate variable in a two-stage 
data-envelopment analysis model. We then expand the WAR model by including a 
window-based approach to take into account the patterns of efficiency over time. The 
results indicate a low level of efficiency over the entire period of analysis, especially for 
Eastern European and Balkan countries rather than Central European countries. Overall, 
we find that inefficiency in CEE countries is mainly driven by the profitability stage rather 
than the value added activity stage. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last two decades, Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have gone 
through an important liberalization and privatization process, and have adopted important 
structural changes that substantially reformed the banking system. This intensive 
restructuring period characterized by relevant regulatory changes has sparked the interest 
of researchers and has been the subject of several studies. Whereas the reform of the 
banking system takes a similar form, the speed of adoption and the effect of such changes 
among CEE countries was different. Overall, the results show that the regulatory changes 
have been beneficial for the efficiency of CEE countries. In particular, several studies 
demonstrate that the privatization of state-owned commercial banks and a more liberal 
policy towards foreign banks enhanced the efficiency of the banking system in CEE 
countries (Bonin et al. 2005, a,b; Fries and Taci, 2005; Hasan and Marton, 2003; Matousek 
and Taci, 2004; Weill, 2003).   
The financing sector in the transition region has gone through important changes 
since the 2008-09 crisis. Prior to the crisis, the banking system played a key role in 
supporting the investment and growth in transaction credit. Especially cross-border capital 
flows covered a pivotal role in spurring the growth in emerging Europe during the 2000s. 
Starting in 2009, transaction countries experienced a sharper drop in the rate of the 
investment and a consistent deleverage process in the banking system (EBRD, 2015), 
which have contributed to a widening of the credit crunch of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). In addition, there was a decline in net capital flows from advanced 
European economies and in the percentage of total assets held by foreign banks. While this 
has worked as an external adjustment mechanism between domestic investments and levels 
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of domestic savings (with the last one traditionally lower than the first one), the sudden 
decline of financial sources has however contributed to an enlargement of the investment 
shortfall (there was a drop by 20 per cent of GDP since 2008, EBRD, 2015).  In this context, 
the large overhang of NPLs has also contributed to exacerbate the drop for investments. 
The rise of NPLs has in fact harmed the banking lending activities, increased funding costs 
and overall decreased operational efficiency. Before, despite the fact that Western countries 
were affected more by the global financial crisis and sovereign debt, transaction countries 
were weakened as well1. Correa and Sapriza (2014) show that sovereign debt problems can 
be transmitted to other countries through global banks that can be either directly or 
indirectly exposed to countries in distress. Further, as explained by Makin and Narayan 
(2011), an economy’s net foreign borrowing is driven not only by domestic saving and 
investment behaviours, but also by foreign saving and investment strategies. In general, the 
financial crisis has harmed banking activities from both the funding side and the lending 
side. In fact, banks reduced their lending activities (e.g. De Haas and Van Horen, 2013), 
while at the same time suffering from pressure due to the freezing of the European 
Interbank market and the risk of withdrawal of deposits from customers (Iyer et al., 2014). 
All these negative events suggest that the recent financial crisis could have exerted a 
negative impact on the efficiency of banks in transaction economies. This could lead to a 
drop of competitiveness of the banking system in these regions with a negative impact on 
their integration process with Western European countries as a consequence.  
In this context, this paper aims to underline banks’ efficiency dynamics to provide 
new insights on the speed and recovery process patterns in transaction economies. In 
                                                            
1http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/REP/regional-economic-prospects1210.pdf, 01/10/2015.  
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particular, we aim to examine to what extent the financial crisis affected the efficiency of 
banks in transaction economies. We further investigate whether and to what extent the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) slowed down the recovery after the 2008-2009 financial 
crisis. Finally, we provide new insights on how and to what extent the GFC affected 
different stages of bank production processes. Our contribution consist of providing new 
insights of how and to what extent the financial crisis affected the different stages of 
production of banking activities. In this way, we can better investigate the source of 
transmission of inefficiency in the banking system during the financial crisis. This issue is 
of great concern to policy makers who need to assess and monitor the stability and 
competitiveness of the European banking system in order to intervene with prompt, 
corrective actions. In particular, we contribute to the existing literature on efficiency in 
transactions countries in different way. First, while previous papers have in fact examined 
the banks’ efficiency of the whole process in transaction economies before the financial 
crisis (e.g. Brissimis et al., 2008; Delis et al., 2011; Havrylchyk, 2006; Koutsomanoli-
Filippaki et al., 2009; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007), we provide novel evidence on how 
and to what extent the GFC affected banks in these countries. Second, we use a two-stage 
DEA model that treats deposits as an intermediate variable in a two-stage DEA model 
(Fukuyama and Matousek, 2011; Fukuyama and Weber, 2010; Holod and Lewis, 2011). 
From an empirical viewpoint, this allows us to disentangle the production process of a bank 
into separate stages by focusing on the lending and funding activities. This is important 
given the changes that occurred in the period of analysis. The boost of credit supply from 
the banking sector, drop of loans to deposits by 120% in 2008 (EBRD, 2015), and limited 
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expansion of the domestic deposit base could have indeed affected both the lending and 
funding side.  
In particular, we make use of the Weight Assurance Region (WAR) model, recently 
developed by Halkos et al. (2015). This new framework combines the two-stage data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) model introduced by Chen et al. (2009) and the assurance 
region approach proposed by Thompson et al. (1990). The additive two-stage DEA model 
of Chen et al. (2009) calculates the contribution of each stage inside the model, in order to 
avoid any bias. However, Halkos et al. (2015) notified an extreme case where the 
contribution of one stage is zero. As explained by Thanassoulis et al. (2004) this may not 
be reasonable. Halkos et al. (2015) proposed the weight assurance region (WAR) model to 
overcome this problem. In addition, the WAR model allows for the incorporating a priori 
value judgements into the model, such as known information and/or widely accepted 
beliefs or preferences, and other types of information as described by Thanassoulis et al. 
(2004). The WAR model is an advancement of the original additive two-stage DEA model 
which can be considered as a special case of the WAR model with no additional 
information. We adapt this model to the banking case. The advantage of this model is 
twofold. Primarily, in the presence of a priori information or prior assumptions, the model 
allows the incorporation of assurance region-based weights regarding the contribution of 
each stage to the overall process. Further, this model has the advantage of being flexible 
and solves the infeasibility problem of the original additive model. Secondly, the paper 
extends the WAR model by including the dimension of time through a window-analysis 
approach. This allows us to include the effects of macroeconomic and structural changes 
in our measures of inefficiencies.  
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The paper presents the following structure: Section 2 briefly discuss the main 
changes in the CEE banking system and recent economic trend; Section 3 presents the 
deposit dilemma and the two-stage DEA models; Section 4 provides the framework and 
the mathematical formulation of the model; Section 5 discusses the results; finally, Section 
6 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  The CEE banking system and recent economic trend 
Starting from the early 1990s, the majority of CEE countries have dismantled the mono-
bank structure and moved to a two-tiered banking system by separating the policy-oriented 
activities of the central bank authorities from business-oriented activities of commercial 
banks. The majority of CEE countries also allowed for the privatization of state-owned 
banks and opened up the frontier to new players, either private banks or foreign banking 
institutions. However, at the beginning of the transaction period, all CEE countries 
experienced a period of instability and underwent a crisis period. Both a liberal licensing 
policy and low minimum capital requirements allowed a high number of new domestic 
commercial banks to enter the markets. These new players, however, started to engage in 
harsh price competition with state-owned banks and aggressive lending strategies 
(Matousek and Sarantis, 2009). This attitude was supported by weaknesses in the legal 
prudential system. In this context, several of these new commercial banks, in general small 
in size, were forced to exit the market or to merge with other banks (Bonin and Wachtel, 
2002). At the same time, state-owned banks suffered consistent losses due to bad loans. As 
pointed out by Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al. (2009), such a phenomenon was intensified 
by bad management, and inadequate banking skills and systems to properly assess credit 
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risks. These unsound practices, combined with structural reforms not efficiently supported 
by a solid regulatory framework, speed and amount of monetary policy interventions, are 
all factors that have contributed to the economic and banking instability of CEE countries 
in the early 1990s.  In response to this crisis period, CEE countries launched a restructuring 
program though a massive privatization process of the state-owned banks, and opened up 
the frontier to foreign banks. The presence of both private and foreign banks started to 
enhance the efficiency of banking system. However, as pointed out by Matousek and Sergi 
(2005) the process of consolidation, privatisation and re-capitalisation of commercial 
banks was not the same across all CEE countries. Baltic countries in particular sped up the 
process of privatization from the first stage of the transaction period, and exhibited the 
highest financial deepening compared to other CEE countries (Matousek and Sarantis, 
2009). In addition to the growth of foreign investment, reduction of import barriers and 
development of a tax policy, also the globalization was an important growth factor of CEE 
economies from 1990 to 2009 (Gurgul and Lach, 2014). 
In the period before the crisis, back in 2006, financial sectors were booming and economies 
were catching up with the more advanced economies in the European Union in terms of 
rates of growth and income. In particular, foreign direct investment (FDI) and cross-border 
capital flows have played an important role in speeding up the growth process of especially 
Central and South-Eastern Europe during the 2000s (EBRD, 2009). 
Following the 2008-09 crisis, there was, however, a drop in net capital flows from 
advanced European economies, while the FDI remained more stable during the crisis. 
Among the CEB and SEE countries, EU regions in particular have put forward a strong 
deleverage process of the banks, that have led to a decrease of credits granted to the 
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industrial sector. Consequently, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
have been affected by the credit crunch in those regions. At the same time, there was an 
increase of debt to GDP ratio by 17 % from 2007 to 2014 (Lo and Rogoff, 2015) in all the 
areas (EBRD, 2015). The high rise of debt can be explained by: i) revaluations of the stock 
of debt when denominated in foreign currency; ii) use of public debt and external 
borrowing by larger companies; iii) increase of NPLs that have contributed to an inflation 
of the debt to GDP ratio (EBRD, 2015). All these figures together explain the slow recovery 
process of the area after the financial crisis 2008-2009. 
 
3. A brief overview of “deposit dilemma” and DEA two-stage network model 
Starting with Greenbaum, 1967 and Benston, 1965’s work, there has been a proliferation 
of studies on efficiency and productivity on banks. In these studies, it is essential to 
correctly specify the inputs and outputs of a banking organization in order to get consistent 
efficient estimates. Despite the large amount of research produced on this theme, the 
definition of inputs and outputs for banks is still controversial. There is in fact an ongoing 
debate on whether deposits should be treated as input or an output in a production function. 
As discussed by Berger and Humphrey (1992), there are three main approaches that a 
researcher can adopt in the choice of bank outputs: the asset or intermediation approach, 
value added or production approach and the cost approach. The first approach treats 
deposits and other liabilities as inputs to produce the earning assets (such as loans and 
securities) of a bank. Instead, the value added or production approach considers every 
financial product with value added activity for the bank, including deposits, as output. 
Finally, the cost approach is a case-sensitive approach that evaluates the relative net 
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contribution of each financial product to the bank revenue. In this formulation, deposits are 
treated as outputs unless their costs are higher than their opportunity costs (otherwise they 
are defined as inputs). Although Berger and Humphrey (1992) express a preference for the 
value-added approach that identifies deposits as bank outputs, how, they also state that 
deposits can be correctly used as inputs in a production function.  
Starting with the work of Fukuyama and Weber (2010), there have been an increasing 
number of studies in the banking field (Akther et al., 2013; Fukuyama and Matousek, 2011; 
Lin and Chiu, 2013; Mukherjee et al. 2003; Yang and Liu, 2012; Wang et al. 2014a,b; 
Wanke and Barros, 2014; Wu et al., 2016) using the two stage- DEA model. The general 
concept of two-stage DEA models is based on the pioneering work of Färe and Grosskopf 
(1996a), who were the first to analyze the sources of efficiency. The two-stage DEA 
models can also be considered as a special case of network DEA models. Wang et al. (1997) 
and Seiford and Zhu (1999) were the first to construct a pure two-stage DEA model where 
all the outputs of the first stage are the only inputs of the second stage.  The two-stage DEA 
model requires the definition of intermediate variables to link different stage of production. 
Differently from the traditional DEA as formulated by Charnes et al. (1978), the two-stage 
DEA model disentangles the internal processes through which inputs are transformed in 
outputs. This model can therefore overcome the deposit dilemma by modelling the dual 
role of deposits through two stages of estimations. Specifically, deposits are the outputs of 
the first stage, while in the second stage they are modeled as inputs to be invested in earning 
assets (Fukuyama and Matousek, 2011; Fukuyama and Weber, 2010; Holod and Lewis, 
2011). By revising the literature2, we can identify four specifications of the two-stage 
                                                            
2 For a detailed review of two-stage DEA models see Cook et al. (2010) and Halkos et al. (2014). 
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network DEA models: independent, connected, relational and game theoretic (Kao and 
Hwang, 2010; Halkos et al., 2014). These models differ from each other in the definition 
of the relationship between the two stages of the production process. While independent 
models apply the traditional DEA approach (Seiford and Zhu, 1999; Wang et al., 1997), 
the others models instead take into account the interactions between the two stages. For 
example, the assumption of a correlation or an additive or multiplicative relationship (Chen 
et al., 2009; Kao and Hwang, 2008) between the overall and the stage efficiencies in the 
relational model or following a game theoretic approach (Liang et al., 2006, 2008). In this 
paper we use the additive efficiency decomposition approach in two stage DEA model 
proposed by Chen et al. (2009). 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Weight Assurance Region (WAR) model 
The assurance region approach in traditional single-stage DEA models imposes 
bounds on the ratios of multipliers (Thompson et al., 1990). In the literature, there are also 
alternative approaches that restrict DEA models through the introduction of additional 
constraints on multipliers such as regression analysis (Dsyon and Thanassoulis, 1988), 
inequalities (Wong and Beasley, 1990; Beasley, 1990, 1995) and absolute weight 
restrictions (Podinovski and Athanassopoulos, 1998). In addition, Charnes et al. (1989) 
restricted multipliers in a closed cone and Zhu (1996) used assurance region to restrict the 
weights of Analytic Hierarchy Process. 
The WAR model has recently been developed by Halkos et al. (2015). This model 
combines a modified version of the relational two-stage DEA model of Chen et al. (2009) 
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and the assurance region concept introduced by Thompson et al. (1990). In particular, it 
assigns assurance region-based weights to determine the contribution of each stage to the 
overall production process. As pointed out by Halkos et al. (2015), the advantage of this 
model consists of including any a priori information available and solves a possible 
infeasibility problem of the original additive model. Specifically, the WAR model is 
appropriate for policy making in the presence of a priori information such as expert 
opinion, known information and/or widely accepted beliefs or preferences and other type 
of information. Furthermore, there is an extreme case of the two-stage additive model 
where the weight of a stage takes the zero value and as a result the individual efficiencies 
cannot be defined. Conceptually, assigning a zero weight to one stage and a unity weight 
in to the other stage has no meaning because there would be no need for a two-stage model. 
Furthermore, from a computational viewpoint there is an infeasibility problem where the 
efficiencies cannot be defined. The WAR model is not affected by the aforementioned 
problem of infeasibility because by construction it restricts the relative weights of each 
stage to be a non-zero number.  
The WAR model follows the additive efficiency decomposition approach proposed 
by Chen et al. (2009). Given n DMUs, 𝑥𝑖𝑗 (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚), 𝑧𝑑𝑗 (𝑑 = 1, … , 𝐷) and 𝑦𝑟𝑗 (𝑟 =
1, … , 𝑠) are respectively the ith input, the dth intermediate variable, and the rth output 
respectively of the jth DMU (𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛). Moreover, 𝑣𝑖, 𝑤𝑑 and 𝑦𝑟 are the multipliers of 
the model. The overall efficiency 0E  presents the following form: 
 
𝐸0 = 𝜉1
∑ 𝑤𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝐷
𝑑=1
∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖0
𝑚
𝑖=1
+ 𝜉2
∑ 𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟0
𝑠
𝑟=1
∑ 𝑤𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝐷
𝑑=1
 
(1)  
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The relative contribution of each stage to the whole process is represented by 𝜉1 
and 𝜉2. These are proxied for the size of each stage. Drawing on Chen et al. (2009)’s 
definition, we define the overall size of the DMU as ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖0 +
𝑚
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑤𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝐷
𝑑=1  which is the 
sum of the first stage size ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖0
𝑚
𝑖=1  and the second stage size ∑ 𝑤𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝐷
𝑑=1 . Consequently, 
the relative contribution of each stage to the whole process can be written as: 
 
𝜉1 =
∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖0
𝑚
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖0 +
𝑚
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑤𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝐷
𝑑=1
       𝑎𝑛𝑑     𝜉2 =
∑ 𝑤𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝐷
𝑑=1
∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖0 +
𝑚
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑤𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝐷
𝑑=1
  
(2)  
where 0 ≤ 𝜉1, 𝜉2 ≤ 1 and 𝜉1 + 𝜉2 = 1. Weights 1 and 2 follow the denominator rule of 
Fӓre and Karagiannis (2013) who have proved that when we aggregate ratio-type 
performance measures we can achieve consistency if we define the weights in terms of the 
denominator.  
Zero value of 1 or 2 means that a stage does not contribute to the overall process at all. 
Instead, a value equal to the unity means that the overall process is entirely based on that 
stage. Assigning zero values to one of the stages leads to an infeasible and conceptual 
problem (Halkos et al., 2015). On one hand, it is not in fact possible to calculate both the 
overall efficiency and the efficiency for each separate stage. On the other hand, it is not 
reasonable to use a two-stage model when one of the stages does not contribute to the whole 
process at all. The WAR model restricts the ratio of weights 𝜉1 and 𝜉2 to be inside a region 
defined by two positive scalars, β and δ: 
 
𝛽 ≤
𝜉1
𝜉2
≤ 𝛿 
(3)  
Note that β and δ represent the prior information and they cannot become zero. This ensures 
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that neither ξ1 nor ξ2 are zero. 
 The VRS version3 of the WAR model proposed by Halkos et al. (2015) is as follows: 
 
 
𝐸0 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝐷
𝑑=1
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑟𝑦𝑟0
𝑠
𝑟=1
+ 𝑢1 + 𝑢2 
  (4)  
s.t. 
∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑥𝑖0 + ∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝐷
𝑑=1
= 1
𝑚
𝑖=1
 
  
 
∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑𝑗
𝐷
𝑑=1
− ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢
1 ≤ 0
𝑚
𝑖=1
, 
 
 
∑ 𝛾𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑗
𝑠
𝑟=1
− ∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑𝑗
𝐷
𝑑=1
+ 𝑢2 ≤ 0, 
 
 
− ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑥𝑖0 + 𝛽 ∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝐷
𝑑=1
≤ 0
𝑚
𝑖=1
 
 
 
∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑥𝑖0 − 𝛿 ∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝐷
𝑑=1
≤ 0
𝑚
𝑖=1
 
 
 𝛾𝑟 , 𝜇𝑑, 𝜔𝑖 ≥ 0  
 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛;  𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚; 𝑑 = 1, … , 𝐷; 𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠  
 β and δ are user specified and (0<β≤δ)  
 𝑢1 and 𝑢2 are free in sign  
Note that the fourth and the fifth constraints in model (4) are the advancement of the WAR 
model. They are derived from inequality (3). They ensure that the ratio of the weights 𝜉1 
and 𝜉2  is between β and δ. 
 The WAR model does not modify the stages’ efficiency. They are defined as in the 
original model of Chen et al. (2009). There may be more than one optimal solution in (4). 
                                                            
3 We use the variable returns to scale version in order to capture any scale effects. Ang and Chen (2016) find 
that the weights of Chen et al. (2009) are non-increasing, which means that the weights of the first stage are 
larger than the weights of the second stage. However, this is only true for the CRS version of the model. The 
VRS version of the model allows for larger weights in the second stage, and it is therefore better suited for 
our case. 
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The authors give pre-emptive priority to one of the stages while maintaining the overall 
efficiency as calculated before. Here, we choose to give priority to the first stage as 
depicted in the next section.  
 
 
𝐸0
1 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝐷
𝑑=1
+ 𝑢1 
  (5)  
s.t. 
∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑥𝑖0 = 1
𝑚
𝑖=1
 
  
 
(1 − 𝐸0) ∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑0
𝐷
𝑑=1
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑟𝑦𝑟0
𝑠
𝑟=1
+ 𝑢1 + 𝑢2 = 𝐸0, 
 
 
∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑𝑗
𝐷
𝑑=1
− ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢
1 ≤ 0
𝑚
𝑖=1
, 
 
 
∑ 𝛾𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑗
𝑠
𝑟=1
− ∑ 𝜇𝑑𝑧𝑑𝑗
𝐷
𝑑=1
+ 𝑢2 ≤ 0 
 
 𝛾𝑟 , 𝜇𝑑, 𝜔𝑖 ≥ 0  
 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛;  𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚; 𝑑 = 1, … , 𝐷; 𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠  
Finally, the second stage efficiency 
2
0E  based on (4) and (5) is calculated as: 
 
𝐸0
2 =
𝐸0 − 𝜉1
∗𝐸0
1
𝜉2
∗  
(6)  
4.2 Window analysis of the WAR model 
We extend the WAR model into a window-based approach in order to incorporate 
the dimension of time in our analysis (see Matousek and Tzeremes, 2015 and Tzeremes, 
2015 for an explanation of the importance of time effects in the efficiency analysis). 
Charnes and Cooper (1985) have introduced the window analysis in order to apply DEA 
models to a panel data context. This technique is based on the principal of moving averages. 
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Essentially, it compares the performance of a DMU not only to the performance of other 
DMUs, but also to its own performance over time. As pointed out by Asmild et al. (2004), 
the window analysis is a useful tool to detect patterns of efficiency over time. The first step 
consists of defining a sliding window to determine the number of periods to include in the 
analysis. In particular, Asmild et al. (2004) suggest to use a narrow window (for example 
three periods to yield credible results). 
Following the notation of Asmild et al. (2004), given n DMUs (𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛) for T 
periods (𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇), we consider 𝑥𝑡
𝑗
= (𝑥1𝑡
𝑗
, 𝑥2𝑡
𝑗
, … , 𝑥𝑚𝑡
𝑗
)′, 𝑧𝑡
𝑗
= (𝑧1𝑡
𝑗
, 𝑧2𝑡
𝑗
, … , 𝑧𝐷𝑡
𝑗
)′ and 
𝑦𝑡
𝑗
= (𝑦1𝑡
𝑗
, 𝑦2𝑡
𝑗
, … , 𝑦𝑠𝑡
𝑗
)′ as respectively the i-dimensional input vector (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚), the d-
dimensional intermediate measure vector (𝑑 = 1, … , 𝐷),  and the r-dimensional output 
vector (𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠)  respectively of the jth DMU at time t. 
A window 𝑘𝑤 with 𝑛 × 𝑤 observations is denoted starting at time k, 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑇 
width w, 1 ≤ 𝑤 ≤ 𝑇 − 𝑘. We define the matrix of inputs as follows:  
𝑋𝑘𝑤 = (𝑥𝑘
1, … , 𝑥𝑘
𝑛, 𝑥𝑘+1
1 , … , 𝑥𝑘+1
𝑛 , … , 𝑥𝑘+𝑤
1 , … , 𝑥𝑘+𝑤
𝑛 ) 
the matrix of intermediate variables is given as:  
𝑍𝑘𝑤 = (𝑧𝑘
1, … , 𝑧𝑘
𝑛, 𝑧𝑘+1
1 , … , 𝑧𝑘+1
𝑛 , … , 𝑧𝑘+𝑤
1 , … , 𝑧𝑘+𝑤
𝑛 ) 
and the matrix of outputs as:  
𝑌𝑘𝑤 = (𝑦𝑘
1, … , 𝑦𝑘
𝑛, 𝑦𝑘+1
1 , … , 𝑦𝑘+1
𝑛 , … , 𝑦𝑘+𝑤
1 , … , 𝑦𝑘+𝑤
𝑛 ) 
The WAR model for the jth DMU at time t takes the following form:  
  𝐸𝑘𝑤𝑡 = max 𝜇 ∙ 𝑧𝑡
′ + 𝛾 ∙ 𝑦𝑡
′ + 𝑈1 + 𝑈2 (7)  
s.t. 𝜔 ∙ 𝑥𝑡
′ + 𝜇 ∙ 𝑧𝑡
′ = 1  
 𝛭 ∙ 𝑍𝑘𝑤 − 𝛺 ∙ 𝑋𝑘𝑤 + 𝑈
1 ≤ 0  
 𝛤 ∙ 𝑌𝑘𝑤 − 𝛭 ∙ 𝑍𝑘𝑤 + 𝑈
2 ≤ 0  
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−𝜔 ∙ 𝑥𝑡
′ + 𝛽 ∙ 𝜇 ∙ 𝑧𝑡
′ ≤ 0 
𝜔 ∙ 𝑥𝑡
′ − 𝛿 ∙ 𝜇 ∙ 𝑧𝑡
′ ≤ 0 
 𝛾𝑟 , 𝜇𝑑, 𝜔𝑖 ≥ 0  
 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛 × 𝑤;  𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚; 𝑑 = 1, … , 𝐷; 𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠  
the first stage efficiency is: 
 𝐸𝑘𝑤𝑡
1 = max 𝜇 ∙ 𝑧𝑡
′ + 𝑈1  
s.t. 𝜔 ∙ 𝑥𝑡
′ = 1   
 (1 − 𝐸𝑘𝑤) ∙ 𝜇 ∙ 𝑧𝑘𝑤 − 𝛾 ∙ 𝑦𝑘𝑤 + 𝑈
1 + 𝑈2 = 𝐸𝑘𝑤  
 𝛭 ∙ 𝑍𝑘𝑤 − 𝛺 ∙ 𝑋𝑘𝑤 + 𝑈
1 ≤ 0  
 𝛤 ∙ 𝑌𝑘𝑤 − 𝛭 ∙ 𝑍𝑘𝑤 + 𝑈
2 ≤ 0  
 𝛾𝑟 , 𝜇𝑑, 𝜔𝑖 ≥ 0  
 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛 × 𝑤;  𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚; 𝑑 = 1, … , 𝐷; 𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠  
 
and then the second stage efficiency based on (7) and (8) is: 
 
𝐸𝑘𝑤𝑡
2 =
𝐸𝑘𝑤𝑡−𝜉1
∗ ∙ 𝐸𝑘𝑤𝑡
1
𝜉2
∗  
 
(9)  
5. Data and results 
5.1. Data and model description 
 Our dataset comprises 116 commercial banks in nine transition economies of 
Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania), the new EU countries, for the period from 2004 to 2015. We 
collected the data from Bankscope. We specify the inputs and outputs of the two-stage 
DEA model following Fukuyama and Matousek (2011) and Holod and Lewis (2011). In 
particular, we use the two-stage approach to overcome the deposits dilemma and ensure 
the dual role of deposits (Fig. 1). In the first stage we use total assets and personnel 
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expenses as two inputs, while deposits function as the output. Deposits then enter the 
second stage as inputs, whereas loans and securities are the final outputs. Narayan and 
Sharma (2011) and Sharma et al. (2014) marked the significance to control for possible 
DMUs’ size effects. In line with the above and following Mastromarco and Simar (2015) 
all variables are logged and normalized with respect to the median—to ensure homogeneity 
assumption in inputs and outputs—before estimation. Fig. 1 presents the framework of our 
model where the first stage measures the value added activity and the second stage 
measures the profitability of the bank. 
 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
 
Usually banks exert a greater control over their inputs compared to their outputs. 
Therefore, we assign a value to in the WAR model in order to ensure that the first stage 
will contribute at least the same as the second stage does to the whole process. Specifically, 
we set β=1 and δ=5. In this way, the first stage contributes to 50%-80% to the whole 
process, while the second stage does so for 20%-50%. We assume that it is not reasonable 
for the second stage to contribute less than 20%. We also ensure that there are no 
infeasibility’ problems4. In addition, we apply the variable returns to scale in order to 
capture scale effects among banks in different countries. 
We choose a 3-year window for our analysis (Asmild et al., 2004). The first window 
includes 2004, 2005 and 2006. The second window moves one year forward omitting 2004 
                                                            
4 Note that we can incorporate all available information regarding the contribution of the two stages to the 
whole process by adjusting the β and δ values in the WAR model. 
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and including 2007. Our analysis includes 10 windows and each window has 348 DMUs 
(𝑛 × 𝑤 = 116 × 3 = 348). The total number of DMUs included in our analysis is 3480. 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study for the overall 
sample over the period 2004–2015. There are considerable variations across firms as 
concerns both the outputs and outputs and inputs as indicated by the large standard 
deviation. 
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
5.2. Empirical Results  
Prior to discussing the efficiency scores at the country level, we provide an 
illustrative example5 of the results for a single bank that we obtained by applying the 
window-based WAR model. We specifically discuss the case of ING Bank Śląski S.A.. The 
bank was established as Bank Śląski in 1988 as a result of the separation from the National 
Bank of Poland. NBP was a typical example of a monobank system in a planned economy 
(in fact there were two banks in Poland, PNB and PKO Bank Polski) and was specialized 
in currency, credits and savings. ING Bank Śląski S.A. was established in 1988 as a state 
bank and later, in 1994, was listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Since the 1996, it is 
part of the Dutch ING Group.  
Table 2 reports the efficiency scores of ING Bank Śląski. In particular, the rows 
indicate the trend across the same window, while the columns indicate the stability of the 
efficiency for a specific year across different windows. The overall efficiency scores seem 
                                                            
5 The results for all banks are available upon request. 
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to increase from 2004 to 2008, they slightly decrease from 2008 to 2013 and then they 
increase again. The value added activity scores appear to be very high and stable across the 
years. The profitability efficiency scores significantly increase from 2004 to 2005 while 
they fluctuate in the following years following the trend of the overall efficiency scores. 
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
Table 3 presents the results for the first top twenty banks6 in terms of average efficiency 
values from all CEE countries and its decomposition into the value added activity scores 
and the profitability scores. We briefly recall that the value added activity scores are 
calculated in the first stage of two-stage DEA model where capital and employees are the 
inputs and deposits are the outputs. Instead, the profitability scores come from the second 
stage analysis where deposits are treated as inputs and loans and securities are considered 
as outputs.  
Our findings indicate that there is still a wide heterogeneity among banks in terms 
of efficiency. The overall efficiency scores, for example, range from 0.198 for Porsche 
Bank Hungaria in 2013 to 1.000 for Estonian Credit Bank in 2004 and Czech Moravian 
Guarantee and Develpoment Bank in 2014 and 2015. Moreover, Československá Obchodní 
Banka appears to have the highest overall efficiency (0.951) and MBank Hipoteczny SA 
exhibits the highest average annual growth (3.6%).  
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
                                                            
6 We provide the results for the first twenty banks relative to the overall efficiency scores in order to preserve 
space. Table of the full results is available upon request. 
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Focusing on the single component of efficiency scores for value added activity 
scores they remain stable until 2012 and then they slightly decrease. By shifting our 
attention to the each single case, we observe that the value added activity scores range from 
0.149 for Porsche Bank Hungaria in 2014 to 1.000 for sixteen banks. On average, Stavební 
Spořitelna achieved the highest efficiency (0.995) and HSBC Bank Polska SA the highest 
average annual growth (15.1%). Compared to the value added activity scores, the 
profitability scores show the largest discrepancies. The scores take the values from 0.05 in 
the case of AS Reverta in 2014 to 1.000 for fifteen banks. On average, Československá 
Obchodní Banka achieved the highest efficiency (0.970) and Credit Europe Bank 
(Romania the highest average annual growth (16.9%).  
As discussed in the methodological section, the evaluation of the efficiencies for 
the first and the second stage is an important tool for the decision makers in order to identify 
the source of inefficiencies of the entire banking system (Wang et al., 2014a,b). As revealed 
by the results, the efficiency scores of the value added activity stage are significantly higher 
than the profitability scores. Therefore, the primary source of inefficiency can be found in 
the profitability stage. Consequently, the decision makers should aim to improve the second 
stage efficiency in order to enhance the overall efficiency.  
As follow, we examine the trend of each country. In particular, we notice that Czech 
Republic and Poland has the largest number of efficiency banks (seven banks) in the group 
of top-20 banks. The average score for all the eleven Czech banks included in the dataset 
is 0.819, with Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka (0.951) and Ceska Sporitelna (0.936) to 
be the highest performers. The average score for all the twenty two Polish banks included 
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in the dataset is 0.717, with Bank Pekao (0.932) and ING Bank Slaski (0.914) to achieve 
the heist scores. We also notice that three Hungarian banks7, two Croatian and one Estonian 
banks are in the top 20. The average score for Hungarian banks is 0.703 (thirteen banks), 
for Croatian banks is 0.622 (twenty five banks) while that one of the Estonian banks is 
0.648 (four banks)8. Bulgaria (0.596), Latvia (0.673), Lithuania (0.644) and Romania 
(0.613) have no bank in the top 20.  
Fig. 2 presents more detailed information on the average efficiency score of the 
banking sector for the individual countries over time. Firstly, we notice different patterns 
in efficiency change across countries and over time. Our findings indicate relatively stable 
average efficiency from 2004 to 2010 for the overall sample (a number of countries such 
as Bulgaria and Czech Republic increased efficiency scores during this period). However, 
in correspondence with the financial crisis, we notice a decrease in efficiency during the 
period 2011-2014. In the years following 2011, there was a reversal trend for the majority 
of countries (e.g. Hungary, Lithuania). This decline in the efficiency of the banking system 
is partially caused by the macroeconomic and political instability of the area.  
In order to examine the robustness of the results we also run a 5-year window. The 
overall efficiency estimates on average terms results are presented per country in Fig. 3. 
We notice that the 3-year window results (Fig. 2) and the 5-year window results (Fig. 3) 
are quite similar. Therefore we can deduce that the results are robust in respect to different 
window width.  
 
                                                            
7 The best performer is OTP Bank with an average efficiency score equals to 0.901. 
8 The best performers in Czech Republic are Československá Obchodní Banka with ab average efficiency 
score of 0.957 and Česká spořitelna with an average efficiency score of 0.915. 
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<Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here> 
 
We find that Romania exhibits a low efficiency scores over most of the period under 
investigation. As pointed out by Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al. (2009), Romania started the 
reform process later compared to other countries in the same area and it was then hardly 
affected by the banking crisis in late 1990s.  However, we notice that it managed to increase 
the efficiency of the banking system over the last few years. Starting from 2010, Romania 
has started to promote some enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and to 
promote a competitive environment9. In a more competitive environment, banks are pushed 
to improve their efficiency profile to preserve their market share and survive. 
Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic display the highest efficiency compared to 
the other CEE countries. Both Hungary and Poland have promoted the government and 
restructuring actions to reinforce budget constraints and to promote corporate governance 
effectively (for example, privatization combined with tight credit and subsidy policies 
and/or enforcement of bankruptcy legislation)10. In addition, Hungary presents more than 
75 per cent of enterprise assets in private ownership with effective corporate governance.  
In line with previous studies (Bonin et al. 2005,a,b; Fries and Taci, 2005; Hasan 
and Marton, 2003; Matousek and Taci, 2004; Well, 2003), we support the view that the 
privatization of state-owned commercial banks can enhance the efficiency in the banking 
system of CCE countries).  
Finally, we do not find a strong match between foreign market share percentage and 
                                                            
9 Data retrieved from Transition indicators by country provided by EBRD, http://www.ebrd.com/what-we-
do/economic-research-and-data/data/forecasts-macro-data-transition-indicators.html, 01/10/2015. 
10 See footnote 7. 
  
23 
overall efficiency scores (Table 4).  
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
One possible reason is that CEE countries benefited in terms of spillovers from an 
increase of foreign presence in the early stage of the liberalization process. Once the 
presence of foreign ownership share achieved a stable level, such positive effect results to 
be less relevant for bank efficiency. This can for example be the case for the Czech 
Republic. In particular, it presents a high percentage of market share of foreign banks, 85%, 
that is stable for the period of analysis. The Czech banking system can have presumably 
benefited from spillovers with foreign investors especially in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
when the foreign market share’s percentage increased from 26% in 1998 to 89% in 2001 
as maintained by Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al. (2009).  
To sum up, Central European countries present a more efficient banking system 
compared to eastern European and Balkan countries over the period analyzed. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper examines the sources of inefficiency for the banks of nine new EU 
members in CEE countries over the period 2004 to 2015. Differently from previous studies, 
we investigate the changes of sources of banks’ inefficiency before and after the crisis, and 
the impact of the GFC on the functionality of the baking system. This is important because 
over this period of analysis, the banking system in transaction economies went through 
profound changes. Back in 2006, the banking sector was booming by strong rates of growth 
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and income, and a converging process towards the western countries in the European 
Union. Following the 2008-09 crisis, the scenario changed profoundly. Several transaction 
countries experience a consistent investment shortfall, rise in indebtedness levels, and a 
large overhang of NPLs. In addition, there was a drop in the cross-border capital flows and 
assets owned by foreign banks, which have played a key role in spurring growth and 
promoting banking efficiency during the 2000s.  
As a further contribution, we make use of a two-stage DEA model where deposits 
are treated as an intermediate variable in the production function. This model allows us to 
overcome the classical dilemma on how to treat deposits in a production function: as either 
inputs or outputs. By disentangling the production function in two stages, we can better 
identify the sources of inefficiencies and provide further guidance to policy makers in 
promoting the development of the banking system in transaction countries. From a 
methodological viewpoint, we apply the WAR proposed by Halkos et al. (2015) to assign 
a weight to each stage of the production process. We expand this model by including a 
window-based approach to take into account the patterns of efficiency over time. This helps 
us to take into account the evolution of banks’ efficiency for the effect of structural and 
macroeconomic changes.  
We provide important new findings and policy implications. Our results reveal 
large discrepancies among CEE countries. In particular, banks in Central European 
countries (Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic) experience higher average efficiencies 
than banks in Eastern Europe and Balkan countries. Our findings also suggest that there 
has been a relative stable and slight increase of the overall efficiency over time until 2010 
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and then slightly decrease. Finally, our analysis shows that the value added activity stage 
exhibits significantly higher efficiency scores than the profitability stage.  
Our findings indicate to policy makers that there are unexplored opportunities to 
enhance the banking efficiency by expanding for example credit supply and financial 
investments. In other words, there are margins to encourage investments in transaction 
countries by reducing inefficiency in loan allocation to create space for the growth of new 
credit. However, such changes should be supported by the improvement of managerial 
skills, adequate technical resources and banking supervision to control for the increase of 
non-performing loans, which have burden CEE countries over the last years. The overhang 
of NPLs has led to the application of restrictive credit constraints that have reduced the 
access to credit of firms and the efficiency of banks’ production process.  In line with 
previous studies (Bonin et al. 2005, a,b; Fries and Taci, 2005; Hasan and Marton, 2003; 
Matousek and Taci, 2004; Well, 2003) we argue that the  privatization of state-owned 
commercial banks can be a possible solution to enhance the efficiency of the banking 
system of CCE countries. However, there is also need and room for the improvement of 
the legislation framework on supervision, insolvency and foreclosure, and banks’ corporate 
governance. Several local authorities have moved in this direction by expressing the 
intention to improve the cooperation agreement with the European Central Bank toward 
the European Single Supervisory Mechanism, such as Bulgaria, and to promote a new 
regulatory framework in the banking sector (EBRD, 2015).  Such initiatives and changes 
in the governance of Europe’s banking sector require a coordinated and unified banking 
supervision system to be effective especially in the case of cross-border banks. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
 Overheads Fixed assets Deposits Loans Securities 
 Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev 
2004 77903 140369.5 2360047 4016570 1847928 3134603 1191649 1902939 911549 1944779 
2005 84566 149259.4 2838447 4818622 2194133 3642495 1479034 2355910 1063632 2344513 
2006 92988 161996.8 3482276 5819047 2701651 4440727 1948216 3130090 1149206 2451656 
2007 112131 193983.3 4340404 7281295 3443306 5825678 2600760 4237421 1250902 2739747 
2008 125866 227608.1 4728153 7427504 3735830 5893119 3016466 4711477 1216900 2505359 
2009 118269 194961.2 4577301 7333737 3728173 5977733 2875545 4455340 1235835 2533198 
2010 115520 198190.9 4703234 7659611 3785671 6221305 2917552 4583739 1325169 2794423 
2011 112496 186192.4 4602434 7461423 3699038 6031279 2851557 4513581 1308723 2649172 
2012 117842 195618.5 4863373 7945373 3875054 6322157 2942769 4744194 1424947 2790308 
2013 121508 210015.8 5005600 8100357 4046433 6557222 2971046 4715994 1534794 2977487 
2014 121577 207629.7 5156010 8287812 4137883 6590401 3012203 4906801 1512229 2566433 
2015 128938 216991.9 5381753 8651703 4302169 6839932 3149994 5282563 1545482 2526695 
 
Note: The table presents descriptive statistics (mean values and standard deviation) for all banks in our sample. (*) Values are in thousands of Euros.  
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Table 2: A three-year window analysis for the ING Bank Śląski S.A. 
 
Overall 
efficiencies  
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
W1 0.873 0.940 0.924          
W2  0.923 0.916 0.872         
W3   0.967 0.925 0.949        
W4    0.964 0.986 0.915       
W5     0.987 0.913 0.922      
W6      0.910 0.919 0.911     
W7       0.908 0.895 0.890    
W8        0.887 0.889 0.882   
W9         0.889 0.881 0.914  
W10          0.870 0.899 0.931 
Averages 0.873 0.932 0.936 0.920 0.974 0.913 0.917 0.898 0.889 0.878 0.906 0.931 
Value added 
activity 
  
         
 
W1 0.983 0.949 0.991          
W2  0.899 0.935 1.000         
W3   0.935 1.000 0.988        
W4    1.000 0.975 0.977       
W5     0.981 0.990 0.987      
W6      0.989 0.987 0.973     
W7       0.995 0.981 0.954    
W8        0.982 0.955 0.982   
W9         0.955 0.985 0.949  
W10          0.985 0.949 0.980 
Averages 0.983 0.924 0.954 1.000 0.981 0.985 0.990 0.979 0.954 0.984 0.949 0.980 
Profitability             
W1 0.763 0.932 0.857          
W2  0.950 0.896 0.744         
W3   1.000 0.850 0.909        
W4    0.927 0.997 0.852       
W5     0.994 0.836 0.857      
W6      0.832 0.852 0.850     
W7       0.821 0.809 0.826    
W8        0.792 0.824 0.781   
W9         0.822 0.777 0.877  
W10          0.755 0.848 0.883 
Averages 0.763 0.941 0.918 0.840 0.966 0.840 0.843 0.817 0.824 0.771 0.862 0.883 
Note: The table presents a 3-year window analysis for the overall efficiency, the first and the second stage 
efficiencies for the case of ING Bank Śląski S.A. 
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Table 3: Average efficiency score over time  
Bank Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Average 
Average 
annual 
growth 
Overall efficiency 
Bank Handlowy w 
Warszawie  
POLAND 0.806 0.833 0.855 0.822 0.832 0.804 0.836 0.871 0.854 0.848 0.009 
Bank Millennium POLAND 0.799 0.822 0.797 0.825 0.847 0.826 0.823 0.835 0.843 0.834 0.009 
Bank Pekao POLAND 0.863 0.867 0.873 0.960 0.918 0.927 0.938 0.946 0.952 0.932 0.012 
Bank Zachodni  POLAND 0.797 0.821 0.819 0.850 0.867 0.858 0.847 0.853 0.828 0.861 0.017 
Ceska Sporitelna  
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.884 0.897 0.910 0.947 0.952 0.956 0.971 0.965 0.976 0.936 0.002 
Czech Moravian 
Guarantee and 
Develpoment Bank 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.736 0.737 0.723 0.737 0.783 0.764 0.722 0.883 0.990 0.837 0.031 
Ceskoslovenska 
Obchodni Banka  
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.888 0.894 0.918 0.982 0.965 0.982 0.991 0.988 0.988 0.951 0.001 
Deutsche Bank 
Polska  
POLAND 0.928 0.929 0.875 0.775 0.710 0.742 0.768 0.914 0.925 0.822 -0.011 
ING Bank Slaski POLAND 0.873 0.932 0.936 0.920 0.974 0.913 0.917 0.898 0.889 0.914 0.007 
K&H Bank Zrt HUNGARY 0.820 0.829 0.836 0.829 0.874 0.871 0.880 0.802 0.795 0.832 0.002 
Komercni Banka 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.887 0.888 0.904 0.928 0.944 0.952 0.958 0.960 0.955 0.926 0.002 
MBank POLAND 0.814 0.816 0.842 0.885 0.910 0.894 0.922 0.934 0.924 0.896 0.013 
OTP Bank Plc HUNGARY 0.884 0.891 0.899 0.913 0.914 0.938 0.926 0.927 0.926 0.903 -0.003 
Primorska Banka  CROATIA 0.750 0.786 0.847 0.935 0.962 0.965 0.952 0.948 0.931 0.856 -0.008 
Raiffeisen stavební 
sporitelna  
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.854 0.854 0.804 0.754 0.784 0.798 0.803 0.816 0.813 0.804 -0.007 
Stavební Sporitelna 
Ceské Sporitelny  
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.871 0.873 0.850 0.824 0.803 0.816 0.848 0.864 0.869 0.845 -0.004 
Swedbank  ESTONIA 0.851 0.911 0.952 0.947 0.941 0.897 0.885 0.757 0.654 0.823 -0.012 
Unicredit Bank 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.795 0.805 0.822 0.847 0.867 0.859 0.841 0.825 0.845 0.851 0.013 
UniCredit Bank 
Hungary Zrt 
HUNGARY 0.756 0.743 0.784 0.794 0.804 0.815 0.754 0.758 0.778 0.793 0.012 
Zagrebacka Banka  CROATIA 0.820 0.824 0.798 0.810 0.823 0.808 0.806 0.810 0.814 0.819 0.003 
Value added activity  
Bank Handlowy w 
Warszawie  
POLAND 0.662 0.757 0.779 0.760 0.719 0.765 0.797 0.763 0.740 0.772 0.030 
Bank Millennium POLAND 0.877 0.893 0.939 0.842 0.856 0.966 0.914 0.915 0.957 0.919 0.009 
Bank Pekao POLAND 0.978 0.949 0.956 1.000 0.970 0.970 0.953 0.939 0.939 0.970 0.002 
Bank Zachodni  POLAND 0.869 0.895 0.907 0.921 0.942 0.971 0.948 0.936 0.920 0.922 0.005 
Ceska Sporitelna  
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.986 0.938 0.969 0.956 0.981 0.975 0.975 0.978 0.977 0.975 0.002 
Czech Moravian 
Guarantee and 
Develpoment Bank 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.820 0.799 0.806 0.840 0.892 0.831 0.829 0.850 0.993 0.886 0.020 
Ceskoslovenska 
Obchodni Banka  
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.880 0.795 0.844 1.000 0.952 0.980 0.997 1.000 1.000 0.934 -0.005 
Deutsche Bank 
Polska  
POLAND 0.866 0.867 0.859 0.842 0.781 0.780 0.852 0.842 0.859 0.870 0.011 
ING Bank Slaski POLAND 0.983 0.924 0.954 1.000 0.981 0.985 0.990 0.979 0.954 0.972 0.000 
K&H Bank Zrt HUNGARY 0.858 0.864 0.867 0.937 0.975 0.981 0.955 0.927 0.794 0.894 0.002 
Komercni Banka CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.992 0.960 0.984 0.995 0.962 0.962 0.952 0.930 0.926 0.966 -0.002 
MBank POLAND 0.830 0.840 0.869 0.904 0.929 1.000 0.989 0.967 0.918 0.861 0.030 
OTP Bank Plc HUNGARY 0.904 0.852 0.824 0.859 0.836 0.892 0.872 0.866 0.861 0.878 0.006 
Primorska Banka  CROATIA 0.667 0.747 0.799 0.897 0.992 0.999 0.979 0.982 0.982 0.870 0.015 
Raiffeisen stavební 
sporitelna  
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.985 0.988 0.986 0.979 0.970 0.974 0.965 0.972 0.964 0.968 -0.004 
Stavební Sporitelna 
Ceské Sporitelny  
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.989 1.000 0.995 0.996 0.995 -0.002 
Swedbank  ESTONIA 0.747 0.882 0.974 0.994 0.971 1.000 1.000 0.830 0.780 0.888 0.018 
Unicredit Bank 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.838 0.812 0.811 0.790 0.791 0.826 0.849 0.850 0.829 0.837 0.005 
UniCredit Bank 
Hungary Zrt 
HUNGARY 0.840 0.813 0.872 0.887 0.908 0.911 0.870 0.894 0.882 0.887 0.009 
Zagrebacka Banka  CROATIA 0.828 0.782 0.791 0.840 0.898 0.934 0.943 0.942 0.954 0.898 0.013 
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Profitability  
Bank Handlowy w 
Warszawie  
POLAND 1.000 0.928 0.947 0.902 0.981 0.851 0.883 0.999 0.996 0.990 -0.010 
Bank Millennium POLAND 0.721 0.750 0.654 0.806 0.836 0.685 0.728 0.753 0.729 0.734 0.016 
Bank Pekao POLAND 0.749 0.783 0.790 0.920 0.867 0.884 0.924 0.954 0.965 0.972 0.025 
Bank Zachodni  POLAND 0.722 0.745 0.726 0.776 0.790 0.745 0.746 0.769 0.732 0.880 0.032 
Ceska Sporitelna  
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.782 0.856 0.850 0.938 0.922 0.936 0.968 0.951 0.975 0.880 0.005 
Czech Moravian 
Guarantee and 
Develpoment Bank 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.634 0.659 0.620 0.614 0.664 0.682 0.592 0.921 0.988 0.974 0.054 
Ceskoslovenska 
Obchodni Banka  
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.897 1.000 0.998 0.965 0.978 0.985 0.985 0.976 0.977 0.984 0.011 
Deutsche Bank 
Polska  
POLAND 1.000 1.000 0.893 0.694 0.619 0.693 0.668 1.000 0.998 0.540 -0.019 
ING Bank Slaski POLAND 0.763 0.941 0.918 0.840 0.966 0.840 0.843 0.817 0.824 0.771 0.018 
K&H Bank Zrt HUNGARY 0.779 0.792 0.802 0.718 0.773 0.761 0.805 0.673 0.796 0.764 0.008 
Komercni Banka CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.782 0.815 0.825 0.860 0.927 0.943 0.965 0.991 0.986 0.927 0.009 
MBank POLAND 0.797 0.789 0.812 0.864 0.891 0.789 0.854 0.902 0.931 0.962 0.020 
OTP Bank Plc HUNGARY 0.864 0.933 0.980 0.972 1.000 0.987 0.986 0.995 1.000 0.954 -0.047 
Primorska Banka  CROATIA 0.882 0.836 0.921 0.991 0.914 0.898 0.883 0.837 0.800 0.513 -0.101 
Raiffeisen stavební 
sporitelna  
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.720 0.719 0.618 0.522 0.595 0.622 0.636 0.656 0.659 0.639 -0.011 
Stavební Sporitelna 
Ceské Sporitelny  
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.741 0.746 0.699 0.647 0.597 0.636 0.686 0.731 0.741 0.723 -0.006 
Swedbank  ESTONIA 0.976 0.941 0.930 0.901 0.911 0.794 0.769 0.673 0.500 0.547 -0.043 
Unicredit Bank 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.752 0.798 0.834 0.915 0.957 0.896 0.832 0.797 0.863 0.895 0.023 
UniCredit Bank 
Hungary Zrt 
HUNGARY 0.659 0.659 0.693 0.695 0.696 0.717 0.626 0.612 0.669 0.709 0.019 
Zagrebacka Banka  CROATIA 0.812 0.873 0.806 0.776 0.741 0.679 0.667 0.676 0.674 0.694 -0.007 
Note: The table presents the average overall and stage efficiency scores for the top 20 performers with respect to 
the overall efficiency. 
 
Table 4: Percentage of foreign ownership share 
Country 2006 2011 
BULGARIA 80.1% 76.5% 
CROATIA 90.8% 90.6% 
CZECH REPUBLIC 84.7% 84.7% (*) 
ESTONIA 99.1% 94.0% 
HUNGARY 82.6% (**) 85.8% 
LATVIA 63.3% 65.0% 
LITHUANIA 91.8% 90.8% (+) 
POLAND 74.2% 69.2% 
ROMANIA 87.9% 81.8% 
Source: EBRD, Share of foreign owned banks11. (*) 2008. Data is not available for later years. (+)Data is not 
available for 2011. (**) Data from 2005. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
11 Data retrieved from http://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/economic-research-and-data/data/forecasts-macro-
data-transition-indicators.html, 01/10/2015. 
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Figure 1: Two-stage bank process 
 
 
 Figure 2: Average country scores over time  3-year window 
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Figure 3: Average country scores over time  5-year window 
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